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Niall G. MacKenzie, Jillian Gordon, and Martin J. Gannon 
A Spirit of Generosity: Philanthropy in the Scotch Whisky Industry 
 
Recent literature on philanthropy and business has focused on the return of 
capital to businesses and entrepreneurs from giving. In this paper, we show 
how historical context impacts the motivations and organizational forms 
created over time in philanthropic giving that effect and affect such returns. 
We do this through the prism of the changing ownership structures in the 
Scotch whisky industry in the twentieth century using an institutional theory 
lens. In doing so, we capture the story of three sisters who inherited a Scotch 
whisky business in the 1940s and transformed it into a hybrid philanthropic-
commercial vehicle that remains in operation today. We present an extended 
theoretical model illustrating the interplay of context, motivation, and 
organizational structure over time on exchanges of capital in entrepreneurial 
philanthropy. 
 






















This article explores the effect of the changing structures of the Scotch whisky industry on the 
blender and merchant Robertson & Baxter, its owners, and related firms. We consider how 
different contextual factors drove the transformation of a family business into a philanthropic-
owned commercial enterprise. This transformation was driven by the family owners—three 
sisters—who established a new organizational form containing both a commercial (Edrington) 
and philanthropic (the Robertson Trust) vehicle. The latter would fund activities for the 
betterment of society for future years and generations. We analyze the combination of 
contextual factors that helped motivate the creation of this organizational form, which sits at 
the intersection of the fields of business and philanthropy. In doing so, we unveil the 
“institutional story” to reveal the complexity of the philanthropic journey and shine light on 
the interweaving of political, economic, social, and cultural factors over time that contributed 
to the transformation of an organizational form. The emergent contextual factors, along with 
the “little narratives” (which form the microfoundations of organizational change) illuminated 
through the historical analysis, facilitate an extension of the theory of entrepreneurial 
philanthropy.2 We illustrate how the confluence of multiple levels of context helped form a 
unique philanthropic organizational form in the Scotch whisky industry, which protected the 
family goals and independence of the firm in a consolidating industry. 
 
Philanthropy and Business History 
 
In a 2012 article on the future of economic, business, and social history, Geoffrey Jones, Marco 
van Leeuwen, and Stephen Broadberry articulated a number of challenges for historians to 
meet to move the discipline forward. One of these challenges, presented by van Leeuwen, asks, 
“Can the historical track record on philanthropy elucidate how, and under what conditions, it 
can be organised in such a way as to maximise revenues, minimise costs, and optimise the 
effects on society?”4 Business history is particularly well placed to answer this question 
because philanthropy often (but not always) emerges out of business success, an area of interest 
to business historians. The intersection of historical context, entrepreneurship, and 
philanthropy is an area of potentially rich research that not only addresses van Leeuwen’s 
question but offers business historians the opportunity to explore bigger societal questions of 
inequality bred by capitalist development (sitting alongside current explorations of the history 
of capitalism), the means to address this, and the role of the state in mitigating and regulating 
its effects. At the heart of this is the role of business and its own development over time. 
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Business historians have recently started to focus more closely on philanthropy, with 
work on the wealthy entrepreneurial philanthropists of the early twentieth century developing 
as a counterpoint to the increasingly prevalent concepts of corporate social responsibility and 
corporate philanthropy in business.7 Bourdieuan capital theory has been applied to the question 
of the type of “return” that philanthropists receive from giving, principally focusing on the 
individual as an entrepreneurial philanthropist. In the context of “world-making” 
entrepreneurial philanthropists, strengthened symbolic capital has been identified as a return 
on philanthropic giving whereby, in certain circles, engaging in philanthropy strengthens 
reputation and legitimizes other aspects of the entrepreneur’s life.8 However, often missing in 
these treatments is cognizance of the antecedents of giving and how the interplay of context 
and organizational forms impact the return to philanthropists. This is similarly lacking in much 
of the entrepreneurship literature, including its impacts on decision-making. 
Historically, there has been a strong tradition of entrepreneurs participating actively in 
charitable giving and philanthropy. Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller used their vast 
personal wealth, accumulated from their business activities, to stimulate social change; both 
remain synonymous with philanthropy around the world.
, which may 
explain the privacy adopted by many philanthropists historically and now.
9 In the United Kingdom, a new breed 
of entrepreneur profited significantly from the Industrial Revolution and catalyzed the 
enlightened entrepreneurship of the Victorian era, including Holloway (patient medicines), Salt 
(textiles), Morley (newspapers and media), Colman (mustard), Cadbury and Rowntree (both 
confectionary), Boot (chemists), and Lever (manufacturing)—all centered largely on Christian 
charitable values. However, philanthropy did not make businessmen immune to criticism, with 
strong critiques projected at them both contemporaneously and posthumously
11 Similarly, that 
businessmen felt moved to engage in philanthropic giving to address what they saw as failings 
in society suggests that the state was either unwilling or unable to address such issues. Yet by 
virtue of its presence and involvement in the economy in different ways, either directly or 
indirectly, encouraged such behaviors. 
Recent work has characterized the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
philanthropy as a linear “journey” from the former to the latter rather than considering the two 
as potentially concomitant activities.
, or where 
charitable giving serves as the operationalization of attitudinal characteristics, such as 
empathy, have also been identified as playing a role.
12 Further, individual motivations—and typically a 
singular key motivation—are often identified as crucial to understanding philanthropic 
activities by entrepreneurs.13 Individual value systems, such as religious obligation
16 Alternatively, emphasis on reputational 
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benefit to the philanthropist, and considerations relating to status, sphere of influence, and 
“world-making,” can explain some philanthropic behaviors.19 Reputational enhancement and 
self-serving psychological benefits drive much of the visible philanthropy we see today, where 
individuals are essentially motivated by being seen to give.20 However, historians would have 
difficulty reconciling the overt focus on internal cognitive processes as being sufficiently 
explanatory, without considering the multiple levels of context in which such decisions and 
motivations play out over time. 
A range of mechanisms can stimulate philanthropic action, and contextual factors often 
encourage individuals and organizations to redistribute their wealth.21 One way of 
understanding why philanthropists give may be found in the context in which they operate. The 
eminent American sociologist Charles Wright Mills argues that “motives are of no value apart 
from the delimited societal situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies. They 
must be situated. . . . Motives vary in content and character with historical epochs and societal 
structures.”22 Mills’s argument calls for analysis of the time period and milieu in which the 
motivations of individuals are analyzed in order to better understand what influences them. 
Historians are acutely aware of his contention that context not only matters in exploring 
motives but also changes over time and across societies. If we accept Mills’s argument, context 
is critical—in both temporal and institutional terms—to understanding philanthropic motives, 
whether potential or articulated. Taking this cue, business history is ideally placed to consider 
the impacts of the complex interplay of motivations and contexts on organizational responses 
to institutional change. This is by virtue of the discipline’s focus on in-depth archival research 
and the importance placed within the discipline on relating the such research to the wider world. 
Based on this principle, and seeking to address van Leeuwen’s challenge to historians, we look 
at how, and under what conditions, philanthropy was deployed within the Scotch whisky 




A number of recent historical organization studies have posited that business history 
suffers from a “lack of generalizability of its findings. Narratives tend to be very particular in 
relation to firms, locations, and time periods, emphasizing uniqueness”—with the implication 
being that there may be no repetition of the conditions stressed within much of the work.23 
Consequently, a number of business historians have detailed the importance of transparency in 
 5 
historical methods, calling on others in the field to articulate their methods more clearly.24 To 
this end, we employ micro, meso, and macro analyses to the motivations, situated actions, and 
context of the journey toward philanthropy in the whisky industry. Consistent within this is the 
use of primary sources of data from public and private archival holdings relating to the 
company (University of Glasgow Scottish Business Archive; the Mitchell Library Archive, 
Glasgow; and the British Newspaper Archive), the whisky industry more generally (National 
Records of Scotland), and the private archive of the Robertson Trust. The paucity of public 
news stories concerning the sisters’ giving during their lives, and their desire that their 
philanthropic activities be given no publicity, required that multiple sources be investigated. In 
using multiple archives to address the privacy issue and gaps in the public record regarding the 
sisters’ giving, we can consider their stated motivations and the interplay with contextual shifts, 
using and extending existing theory accordingly. 
 
The Robertson Family 
 
Founded in 1860 in Glasgow, Robertson & Baxter, a Scotch whisky blender and wine 
merchant, in time became “the most important of its kind in the country.”25 The company’s 
founder, William Alexander (W. A.) Robertson, was a noted philanthropist in his native 
Ayrshire, “generous with his money, giving freely, but unobtrusively, to charity” until his 
sudden passing in 1897.27 Upon his death, Robertson’s estate was worth just under £190,000 
(£19.8 million in current prices), of which £160,000 comprised his 60 percent stake in 
Robertson & Baxter. Just three years previously, the U.K. government had imposed death 
duties for the first time, prompting Robertson & Baxter to immediately, and presciently, 
organize itself into a limited company, with Robertson’s estate bequeathed to a consolidated 
family trust where 75 percent of the income from the shares was to be assigned to educating 
his ten children and the estate split mostly equally. Moreover, shares could not be sold until 
the youngest of his children reached the age of twenty-one, and only the two eldest boys, James 
and Alexander, were to be involved in the business.28 This would prove to be important in the 
later transformation of the business. Within five years of taking over the family business, James 
had four young children: Elspeth (b. 1896), Agnes Heatley (b. 1897), William (Billy) 
Alexander (b. 1899) and Ethel (Babs) Greig (b. 1902); his wife died in childbirth with Ethel.29 
The arrival of the children coincided with a slump in whisky sales that continued well into 
World War I exacerbated by state wartime controls applied to cereal and grain production, 
which impacted profits. The personal cost was far greater, however, with Billy dying as a 
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victim of the influenza epidemic, leaving the family business with no natural heir—
Robertson’s son Alexander was childless, and James’s three remaining children were girls, 
who were not expected to participate in what was, and remains, a male-dominated industry.30 
Within twelve months of the war ending, controls were lifted and demand for whisky 
soared, despite the introduction of Prohibition in the United States in 1920. This inspired 
bumper profits in 1921–1922 but in turn created another issue. With growth came a stroke of 
luck—a number of James’s and Alexander’s hitherto silent sibling shareholders sought to 
realize their now very valuable holdings, which would have a knock-on effect on the 
organization’s ability to change in later years. An agreement was made in December 1922 to 
liquidate the business voluntarily, selling a number of shares and whisky stocks to a consortium 
of whisky producers for £2 million (around £97 million in current prices).31 The siblings who 
liquidated their shareholdings were instructed that they, and any successors, would receive no 
further shares or roles in any future business. A new company was formed, named Robertson 
& Co., with James owning 58 percent of the business and Alexander the remainder. Following 
a rocky initial few years, they reacquired the name Robertson & Baxter Ltd. from the liquidator 
for posterity in 1927. The company operated at a loss until Prohibition was abolished in the 
United States, on December 5, 1933, resulting in a huge sales increase driven by American 
demand for Scotch whisky that saw the company more than double in turnover. In 1937, the 
decision was made to transfer all the assets from Robertson & Co. to Robertson & Baxter Ltd., 
reviving the original family business name with James remaining the majority shareholder and 
Alexander holding a smaller amount. 
At this point, James Robertson was seventy-three years old. Considering the future of 
his family in the business, and with no natural heir following the passing of his only son, he 
transferred three thousand shares in the new company to each of his three daughters, Elspeth, 
Agnes, and Babs, who, prior to this event, had had very little to do with the business. In January 
1944, James died at the age of eighty. A kind and courteous man, he was well liked by the staff 
of his company and knew each worker personally, a trait that his daughter Babs would also 
adopt in running the business. James left his estate, worth around £200,000 (around £7.4 
million in current prices)—including the controlling interest in Robertson & Baxter and the 
Clyde Bonding Company, as well as the shareholding in Highland Distillers (founded by his 
father William Robertson)—to be split equally among his three daughters. Moreover, a portion 
of the business was sold to Highland Distillers, creating an enduring link between Robertson 
& Baxter and Highland.36 
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Before becoming involved in the family business, the sisters’ lives were perhaps typical 
of daughters of wealthy businessmen and high society; a nanny took on the maternal role in 
helping raise them as children, and they undertook various charitable activities as they grew 
up. As adults they split their time between Edinburgh, their hunting lodge in Kintail in the 
Scottish Highlands, and London, where they mixed with the upper echelons of society (their 
maternal uncle, Sir Louis Greig, was King George VI’s confidant and personal surgeon and a 
friend of Winston Churchill, along with many of the British establishment).37 This upbringing 
hardly prepared them for running a Scotch whisky company but would later prove critical to 
the preservation of their business. 
 
Family Ownership, Philanthropy, and Takeovers in the Scotch Whisky Industry 
 
Family trusts and company ownership in the Scotch whisky industry were not 
uncommon—Peter Thomson (Perth) Ltd., Dewar’s, Bell’s, and Macdonald and Muir Ltd. 
(Glenmorangie) were all part-owned or controlled by family trusts, often as a response to 
taxation rules. While Dewar’s co-owner Tommy Dewar engaged in global corporate 
promotion, his brother (and the company’s other co-owner) Lord Forteviot founded the 
Forteviot Trust in 1925, to direct significant sums of money and land to his hometown of Perth 
after the company was sold to Distillers Company Ltd. (DCL).39 Arthur Kinnaird Bell, the third 
generation of the family business, founded the Gannochy Trust in 1937 by gifting his shares in 
Bell’s to establish the trust. Bell’s was 69 percent owned and controlled by the trust, but over 
time it reduced its shareholding before selling up altogether when Guinness took over the 
company in 1985.40 In each of these examples the family trusts were charitable entities that 
owned shares in the commercial organizations and dispersed monies to worthy causes while 
also acting as deterrents to hostile takeover bids. However, all were ultimately divorced from 
the original firms that had established them, whether through the selling of shares in the original 
family business or by the end of family lines, resulting in eventual takeover. 
Yet, while a number of Scotch whisky producers remained in family hands, takeovers 
were becoming increasingly common in the interwar period. Recognizing the growing potential 
of the product, North American firms began to enter the industry, with Seagram’s, Hiram 
Walker, and National Distillers Products all purchasing Scottish distillers.42 The industry 
boomed in the 1930s; in 1937, the export market for Scotch outgrew the home market for the 
first time.43 However, the outbreak of World War II quickly quashed its remarkable growth, 
leading to a relative hiatus in the takeover of Scotch whisky producers, blenders, and merchants 
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due to tight government controls on cereal and whisky production for the war effort. At this 
time, the industry faced difficulties—many distilleries remained closed due to the controls and 
no whisky at all was produced in 1943 and 1944.
, meaning Robertson & Baxter were in a precarious position.
44 Robertson & Baxter found itself in 
extremely pressing circumstances, reliant on existing stocks. In August 1944, the U.K. 
government relaxed controls, allowing whisky producers to start up their stills again on the 
condition that they concentrate their efforts on exporting.45 In midsummer 1946, the Robertson 
& Baxter board learned of a planned offer for the company from Canada-based Seagram’s, 
owned by renowned distiller Sam Bronfman.46 In 1947, the stocks in the whisky industry were 
around half of their prewar levels 48 
Bronfman, sensing a potential bargain and seeking to strengthen his position in the industry, 
visited Glasgow in 1947 to meet with Babs Robertson (appointed on the sisters’ behalf to run 
the business) and to purchase Robertson & Baxter. Determined to maintain independence, Babs 
swiftly rebuffed him and stated, “The shares are not for sale at any price.”49 The sisters 
determined that they would remain in the whisky business as an independent organization 
despite consolidating ownership in the industry. 
At the end of World War II, the Scotch whisky industry found itself at the beginning of 
significant change in both size and composition. Scotch was (and remains) a strong currency 
earner due to its high value-to-volume ratio. The U.K. government, keen to address its balance 
of payments problems and the cost of reconstruction, directed producers to export to “hard 
currency” areas such as the United States to earn foreign currency.50 The consequent growth 
of Scotch whisky in the United States saw numbers of North American entrants in the industry 
increasing after World War II. In 1948, following the rejection by Robertson & Baxter, 
Seagram’s purchased the Aberdeen-based blenders and merchants Chivas Brothers, before 
engaging in a further acquisition spree of distilleries, blending, and bonding companies. Hiram 
Walker also began another takeover spree, buying its own blenders, merchants, and distilleries 
between 1953 and 1955.51 Similarly, in 1956, Schenley Industries purchased Seager Evans and 
its various whisky distilleries. These takeovers materialized against a backdrop of rapid 
industry growth that was largely export driven at the strong encouragement and direction of 
the U.K. government, which was looking to earn important foreign currency for its balance of 
payments problem, growing as a proportion from 50 percent of total production in 1939 to 75 
percent by 1954.52 
 
Edrington Holdings and the Robertson Trust 
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The performance of Robertson & Baxter in the 1950s mirrored that of the industry 
generally.53 Exports to North America grew exponentially, profits increased, and Scotch 
whisky producers consequently received greater attention from large North American 
companies. Robertson & Baxter blended the increasingly popular Cutty Sark whisky for Berry 
Bros, sales of which exceeded one million cases overseas—the first time in the industry’s 
history a Scotch whisky brand reached that number. Indeed, between 1958–1959 and 1961–
1962, sales of blended whisky for the company more than doubled, selling over two million 
gallons; as a result, Robertson & Baxter’s profits increased from £489,000 to £1,710,153 
during the same period.54 Such growth was of clear interest to foreign predators, and the 
shareholding arrangements for Robertson & Baxter meant that the business was exposed. 
Highland Distillers owned 35 percent of Roberson & Baxter through the cross-shareholding 
arrangement, but this was publicly held, meaning it could theoretically be taken over and 
Robertson & Baxter’s independence threatened accordingly. Given the climate of takeovers at 
the time, and the approach made by Seagram’s to Highland, this was a legitimate and growing 
possibility. 
In 1955, the Robertson sisters faced the second takeover attempt in a decade, following 
an approach made by whisky broker Stanley P. Morrison (who would later own Bowmore 
distillery) on behalf of an “unnamed American syndicate”—which turned out to be Seagram’s, 
and Bronfman, again. Bronfman sought to purchase Highland Distillers but was rebuffed amid 
threats made by DCL—then the world’s largest Scotch whisky producer—to contest the bid. 
DCL feared that Highland, one of its principal producers of “fillings” (single malts) for its 
Scotch whisky blends, would be lost if it were to be taken over by a foreign competitor.55 
Helped by the show of support from DCL, Highland rejected Bronfman’s advances. Witnessing 
the structural changes in the industry and the growing North American influence, the 
Robertsons realized not only that attempts to buy their company and large swathes of the 
industry would continue, but also that the three of them wouldn’t be around forever to reject 
future advances. 
It was against this backdrop of foreign takeovers and industry growth that institutional 
forces acted to frame the possible ways in which the sisters and their trusted business team 
might best protect their collective interests.56 At the time, the sisters were aged sixty-four, 
sixty-three, and fifty-seven; all were unmarried and childless. Death duties for estates valued 
over £1 million were 80 percent.57 In the Robertsons’ case, the death of any of the sisters would 
require the breakup of the companies to pay the duty, with likely redundancies as a result. The 
conflating contexts—including the Seagram’s takeover attempts of 1947 and 1955, structural 
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changes in the industry, consolidation of ownership in the industry, the system of taxation, and 
the march of time for the sisters personally—created the conditions necessary for them to 
consider the future of their businesses more creatively. Babs “later confided that one of the 
reasons she would not entertain Sam Bronfman was the fact his way of business took no 
account of people; she also felt that an approach to buy out the family so soon after her father’s 
death was unsympathetic and in poor taste.”59 In a talk given in 1957, Janet reminisced about 
the sisters’ time doing voluntary work in nurseries, schools, hospitals, and boys’ clubs in 
Edinburgh between the two world wars, where they “learned to understand the points of view 
and problems of the less fortunate” and felt their lives were “enriched and made fuller by these 
experiences.”60 Later that year, at a cancer fundraising event, she remarked that it “was a thing 
the State should really take up, but it was all left to voluntary contributions.”61 Facing the 
potential destruction of the family business, and their employees losing their jobs, in 1960 the 
sisters decided to consolidate their holdings in the family businesses of Robertson & Baxter 
and Clyde Bonding Co., along with their shares in Highland Distillers, and create a holding 
company, Edrington Holdings (named after their farm). Commensurately, they created a 
charitable entity, the Robertson Trust, by trust deed, gifting their shares in the new holding 
company to the charity. Gifts to charitable trusts in Scotland were (and still are) exempt from 
tax, so in gifting their shares in the holding company to the Robertson Trust the sisters retained 
control of the company through appointing themselves as trustees but would no longer benefit 
financially to the same extent. 
To create the trust, the sisters leveraged their social positioning to access elite networks 
through familial connections and enlist the help of law and finance experts based in London, 
including several members of elite London society. One was Lord Catto, director of Morgan, 
Grenfell, and son of the former governor of the Bank of 
England.
the city’s leading merchant bank, 
64 Leading estates and tax barrister Charles Beattie QC of Lincoln’s Inn, one of the 
most prestigious and oldest legal entities in the United Kingdom, was also recruited to help.65 
Finally, they sought help from leading trust lawyer Christopher J. Malim, a member of the 
Council of the Law Society (who subsequently became a trustee of the new charity).66 These 
individuals were high-society professionals in fields accessible only to those with the 
connections, standing, and economic wealth of the Robertson sisters. The use of family trusts 
is an important point; trusts in Scotland date back to medieval times as a means of managing 
and protecting property and have been widely used by a variety of organizations ever since.67 
Edrington’s preference shares were assigned to the trust and the sisters, with the 
remainder distributed to staff. Written into the articles of association for the new holding 
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company was that it could not issue further shares equal to or in excess of the preference shares 
gifted to the trust, ensuring indivisibility between the two. They accomplished this by also 
gifting money to the trust to allow it to purchase further shares in the holding company if they 
became available (to retain control) and to help sustain and capitalize the trust for philanthropic 
giving using the dividend payments from the consolidated holdings for both investment and 
giving.68 Further, the articles of association for the company mandated that it would remain 
private, that “no invitation at any time shall be made to the public to subscribe for any shares,” 
and that “a Cardinal principle of the Company is that it is to be and to remain under British 
control. . . . [N]o foreigner shall be qualified to hold office as a Director of the company.”69 
The trust deed also stated that “trustees shall be debarred and are hereby specifically debarred 
from selling, alienating or otherwise disposing of their beneficial ownership of and in the stocks 
and share voting or non-voting held by them in the Company.”70 The trust deed effectively 
built in protective measures to address the threats of a foreign takeover, maintaining the 
company’s legitimacy, status, and positioning as a world-leading producer of Scotch whisky. 
Trusts in Scotland were and remain binding, which meant the sisters’ decision could only be 
reversed (if they sought to) by appealing to the Court of Session (the supreme civil court in 
Scotland) and giving good reason why they should want to reverse their decision. The action 
taken by the sisters protected the business’s longevity against the threat of death duties enforced 
by the state. 
The Robertson Trust was formally established on May 1, 1961, with the sisters 
appointing themselves as trustees along with directors from Robertson & Baxter (John 
MacPhail and Bruce McNeil, both chartered accountants) and Clyde Bonding Co. (John 
Henderson, the general manager) as well as Malim, to provide legal advice.
, and 
71 The latter was to 
prove an astute appointment as it was three years before the trust made its first charitable award, 
owing to difficulties in arranging shareholdings, ownership, and directorships in such a way as 
to avoid the undue attentions of the U.K. tax authorities, who closely monitored the operations 
of the trust of the whisky industry more generally because of its booming growth.73 Once 
configured, the trust began to identify its intended causes for support, which reflected the 
interests of the trustees, including education, research into the sociocultural and health effects 
of alcohol, health research, elderly care, and the provision of money to support a lifeboat in 
Scotland—all of which remain the principal foci of the trust’s operations today.74 The trust was 
endowed with both shares and monies drawn from the sisters’ companies; the shares were to 
create dividend payments so the trust would have an ongoing income stream tied to the firm’s 
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performance. The endowment was to be invested in diversifying its income streams so as to 
avoid dependence on any single source.75 
Under the stewardship of the sisters, strong profits from the firms quickly followed, 
growing in line with the industry. The sisters embarked upon a series of acquisitions 
themselves: Hepburn & Ross in 1959, Lang Brothers in 1965, and Highland’s purchase of 
Matthew Gloag and Son (with its Famous Grouse brand) in 1970 (ironically, the cost of death 
duties faced by the Gloag family). Edrington soon became one of the most powerful 
independently owned companies in the industry. Despite the company’s significant sustaining 
growth, Babs Robertson regarded “the people employed by the company . . . as an extension 
of her own family,” and the sisters insisted that it retain the family “feel.”77 Edrington’s former 
chairman Sir Ian Good remarked, “Babs made it her duty to get to know every employee at a 
more personal level than simply knowing their names, and she encouraged staff to bring any 
problems directly to her. . . . Babs’ attitude was: ‘When someone in the family is in trouble, 
the family rallies round.’”78 
The importance of the firm’s staff to the sisters is highlighted by their insistence on a 
formal dinner-dance at the end of each year, which all staff were to attend in formal attire 
arriving by taxi, all paid for by the company, so everyone was included and felt valued. This 
approach to running the business extended to a share-save scheme, with staff given the option 
of purchasing shares in Robertson & Baxter, to keep or to sell back to the business when they 
saw fit (a practice that endures to this day).79 
Growth of the business meant that an increasing amount of money was returned to the 
Robertson Trust as principal shareholder in the consolidated holdings, resulting in a 
commensurate increase in its charitable giving. The first three years averaged giving of £10,000 
per annum. In 1967, the trust’s income was £67,000, much of which was redistributed; by 1972 
it was giving away £80,000; by 1981 this had increased to over £160,000; and by 1984 it had 
again increased, to £268,000.80 In 1984, an agreement was made that no more than 70 percent 
of the trust’s income should be regarded as available for giving, of which a ratio was drawn up 
of 1 percent for charities of the aged, 15 percent for animal welfare, 15 percent for “service-
type” charities, 20 percent for medical care and research, 10 percent for youth activities, 20 
percent for alcoholism, and 5 percent for education, arts, and heritage. A revised list of regular 
beneficiaries was also agreed on.81 The remaining 30 percent of the trust income was retained 
for reinvestment to diversify income streams. 
In 1971, the trustees decided on a strategy for the trust in terms of its giving and its 
relationship with the company. Babs made clear her (and by extension her sisters’) desire for 
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anonymity in their charitable activities. A fellow trustee, Bruce McNeil, suggested that 
complete anonymity was impossible because of the need to satisfy the U.K. tax authorities that 
monies were being “expended wholly for charitable activities”; however, he spoke of “certain 
ways in which the dangers of publicity could be avoided,” with the trustees agreeing to seek to 
ensure their giving was done with as little publicity and public recognition as possible.82 This 
would characterize the trust’s giving for nearly thirty years, at a time when public debates over 
philanthropy and elitism in Scotland were vociferous and ongoing.83 Privacy afforded a degree 
of protection, as well as imitating the “inscrutable” nature of the whisky industry more 
generally.84 The sisters’ privacy and desire for no publicity of their giving resulted in no 
obituaries until the last sister died,85 little to no press attention on their activities as whisky 
industry leaders, and no public pronouncements concerning their philanthropy. 
The only public indication of their philanthropic giving was the naming of a lifeboat in 
the North of Scotland as the Three Sisters. The name inspired an intrepid journalist to learn the 
identity of the three “mysterious sisters living in the South of Scotland” who had given the 
money to establish the lifeboat—and to incur the wrath of Babs as a result. Sir Ian Good 
recounts, “Miss Babs came into the office and said, ‘Who is it? They must have got this 
information from somewhere. . . .’ I can assure you we wouldn’t do it (and) we would know 
the reaction. We had this situation where this guy had done this research, had found out, I don’t 
know how he had found out. Miss Robertson was furious.”86 
The intractable relationship between the trust and businesses was tested in 1979 when 
Hiram Walker bid for Highland Distillers. Both Babs and John MacPhail were vehement in 
their belief that Highland should remain independent, not least because of the potential danger 
that a foreign takeover posed to the independence of Robertson & Baxter because of Highland’s 
significant and longstanding cross-shareholding in the firm. They sent letters to Highland’s 
shareholders urging them to “keep Highland independent!” and engaged public opinion to 
support their position. MacPhail, in a foretelling letter, outlined their argument thus: “Does 
Scotland want its heritage sold overseas?”87 The sisters and MacPhail garnered significant 
public and political support for their position. The desire to retain independence was met with 
agreement by the U.K. government, which decided against approving the proposed takeover. 
It was not until 1988, twenty-seven years after its formation, that the Robertson Trust 
consented to any kind of full public recognition of its activities, with the naming of a second 
lifeboat, the Babs and Agnes Robertson, named for the two sisters who predeceased Elspeth.88 
Following Elspeth’s death in 1989, the trust became more open to publicizing donations, but 
its relationship with Edrington has remained relatively unheralded. This changed in 1999, when 
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Edrington moved to take full control of Highland Distillers in a £600 million deal. Ultimately, 
it secured the firm’s independence, distillery ownership, and subsequent brand portfolio of 
famous Scotch whiskies including Macallan, Cutty Sark, Highland Park, Famous Grouse, and 
Glenrothes, and the Brugal rum brand. The Robertson Trust’s current day giving, still owning 
and drawing income from the consolidated holdings, is £19.9 million, with £314 million in 
assets comprising its portfolio of investments and shares in Edrington.89 As one observer noted, 
the sisters were “three very forceful ladies who were determined to keep the Robertsons in the 
whisky business in perpetuity.”90 Through safeguarding the independence of the commercial 
vehicle, the sisters secured a continuous flow of philanthropic capital and its associated 
redistribution through the trust, as evidenced six decades later. It has culminated in more than 
£300 million (current prices) given away within Scotland since its inception.91 
 
Symbiotic Entrepreneurship and Philanthropy: The Role of Multiple Levels of Context 
 
The evolution of Robertson & Baxter from an independent family-owned business 
portfolio to the symbiotic formation of the Robertson Trust and Edrington Holdings occurred 
in response to micro, meso, and macro environmental influences.92 In identifying and 
explicating these conditions, our analysis addresses van Leeuwen’s challenge to historians to 
try to understand under what conditions, and how, philanthropy can be organized to create 
maximum benefit for society. We propose that three principal, interrelated levels of context 
help to explain. 
At a micro level, the sisters had a lifelong familial tradition of philanthropy but were 
aging, were unmarried, and had no heirs to succeed them in the family business. They were 
supported by an astute group of businessmen and advisors whose collective interests, identities, 
resources, and abilities all converged on securing the longevity of the business. This is 
representative of multiple micro motives and narratives, which contribute to our understanding 
of the micro influences of organizational change.93 The sisters were acutely aware of the 
potential impact of paying death duties to the state and, faced with circling predators and 
takeover attempts, knew the business was unlikely to survive, which would jeopardize not only 
the workforce but the communities and families they served. 
At a meso level, the organizational creation was set against Scotch whisky sales 
flourishing during the post–World War II period, growing exponentially, and consequently 
attracting the attention of bigger players in the market—moving the industry toward 
consolidation. North American firms’ continued interest grew commensurately with demand 
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in their home markets for Scotch, illustrated by the wave of acquisitions across an industry 
historically characterized by independent family businesses. Having resisted a number of 
takeover attempts, and committed the business to independence, the sisters’ interlocking of the 
philanthropic and commercial interests in a symbiotic arrangement secured their wishes. 
At a macro level, institutional forces had an accumulative effect on the sisters. In this 
sense, the state, directly and indirectly, provided the necessary conditions for the creation of 
the dual philanthropic and commercial organizations. The U.K. government’s taxation laws at 
the time were an obvious direct factor in motivating the sisters to adapt their organizational 
structure to ensure longevity, but so too were its controls on whisky production and explicit 
push toward exporting for foreign currency earnings, to help fix its balance of payments 
problems. Indirectly, the state’s willingness (for the most part) to see foreign owners take over 
large parts of the industry meant the sisters were acutely aware that the trend for foreign 
takeovers would continue. It was rare for the government to step in and stop such takeovers, 
although the rejection of Hiram Walker’s bid was one example that directly benefited 
Edrington. Government policy created different kinds of incentives and conditions at different 
levels that heightened the sisters’ (and their advisory team’s) understanding of their need to 
adapt to the wider context.94 Moreover, the broader economic and political pressures arising 
from state actions and industry consolidation are important considerations in explaining the 
changing behaviors in the industry around ownership. 
The creation of the dual vehicles brings to mind the theory of microbehavior and neo-
institutionalism, which emphasizes behavior that is appropriate to the context being driven by 
belief systems that are socially constructed. The sisters’ access to elite-level support is 
characteristic of their “super reflexive” status—their social standing and ownership of a 
growing global business meant they could engage support from elites in the legal and financial 
sectors to realize their aims and effect change in the organizational and industry fields 
accordingly.95 The sisters’ family wealth, networks, status, and position in business and society 
afforded them access to the expertise and cultural capital of leading lawyers, accountants, and 
tax advisors, whose advice and guidance was instrumental in the translation from philanthropic 
motivation into the organizational change. All are relative to the normative pressures of 
institutional isomorphism extended via the application of cultural capital of relevant 
professions, their common behavior, and attributes, which shaped the creation and realization 
of the symbiotic entities. The symbolic return of capital to the sisters as a central tenet of 
entrepreneurial philanthropy is not evidenced here, owing to their demand for, and achievement 
of, anonymity. 
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It is thus important to emphasize the sisters’ demand for privacy as paramount; little 
exists in public discourse regarding their motivations for charitable giving. Mills’s vocabularies 
of motive theory is of value here, in focusing our attention on the importance of context: the 
sisters offered no public pronouncements during their lives on the why or how of their giving, 
seeking to obfuscate this information wherever possible. The language used privately in the 
trust minutes is focused around attempting to address needs and causes close to their interests—
alcohol’s societal impact, animals, education, and the elderly—while maintaining the focus of 
giving principally to Scottish causes and highlighting the “dangers of publicity.” This suggests 
that existing entrepreneurial philanthropy discourse is incomplete in its characterization of 
philanthropy as a means of reputation enhancement. With particular reference to this story, a 
wider consideration of motivations, context, and organizational forms in historic analysis 
provides us with a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the relationships between 
business, the state, and philanthropy. 
Harvey, Maclean, Gordon, and Shaw suggest that entrepreneurial philanthropy is more 
than simply divesting oneself of economic capital by giving to charity or administering grants; 
instead, contemporary entrepreneurial philanthropy should be considered more as “the pursuit 
by entrepreneurs on a not-for-profit basis of big social objectives through active investment of 
their economic, cultural, social, and symbolic resources.”96 In their model, they do not consider 
how different levels of context and motivations impact the organizational form and what this 
means for the interplay of different forms of capital in philanthropic giving. The Robertson 
sisters deployed their symbolic, cultural, and social capital to philanthropic ends through the 
creation of an organizational form that was directly affected both by their motivations and by 
the different levels of context. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In our model, multiple levels of context influence the motivations of the individual/s 
creating the organization and the organizational form it takes. This, in turn, determines how 
the multiple forms of capital (economic, social, symbolic, and cultural) that interact in 
philanthropic giving. While Harvey et al. emphasize the convertibility of economic capital as 
necessitates returns, our model emphasizes how the organizational form can dictate what types 
of capital are returned depending on the motivation of the individual/s creating it. Thus we 
contend that our model emerges from the institutional story of the sisters and their philanthropic 
behavior and captures the impact of different levels of context on the antecedents and 
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development of entrepreneurial philanthropy. In presenting this, we further address a gap in 
entrepreneurship research identified by Geoffrey Jones, who states, “Entrepreneurship remains 
a weak area of management which has struggled to incorporate context in its explanations.”97 
The sisters’ actions align with the construct of generativity.98 Deconstructed, 
generativity comprises two parts: first, creation of a product or project, and second, specific 
benefit to a community.99 Generativity here extends to both commercial and philanthropic 
domains because the action taken helped to secure the prominence of the commercial vehicle 
and enabled its capacity to grow, scale, and compete successfully in a global market, in turn 
fueling the philanthropic vehicle. However, the institutional complexity of operating through 
intersectoral coordination in two sectors, wealth creation and philanthropy, where the field 
rules and logics are contradictory, demands a fine balancing act of the tensions between the 
conflicting demands and logic.100 To retain external legitimacy in the commercial sector 
without tipping the balance of logics in the field of philanthropy demanded careful 
management of the dominant players and issues across the fields of politics, medicine, and 
business. It is within this context that the source of wealth, which underpins the philanthropy, 
is the production and sale of alcohol—the impacts of which on society are evidenced in 
sociological, economic, and physical matters.101 From the outset, the sisters donated significant 
philanthropic sums to research that focused on the medical and sociological effects of alcohol, 
that supported education, and that focused on mitigating damage caused by alcoholism. In this 
context, “meta-goals” symbiotic of both commercial and philanthropic organizations are 
viewed here as integral to the construction of a “coherent partnership identity” that supports 
legitimacy and survival in the field.103 The innovative nature of the sisters’ creation of the 
organizational form simultaneously maintained the entrepreneurial motive of capital 
accumulation and philanthropic redistribution of capital. 
The gifting of shares in Edrington Holdings to the Robertson Trust is consistent with 
behaviors identified elsewhere in the United Kingdom at the time, regarding giving and the 
protection of wealth more generally. For the period between 1960 and 1971, Horsman found 
“a growing tendency for wealth-holders to try to avoid duty by means of gifts,” again 
illustrating the importance of the state in the background to the story.104 Realization of the 
sisters’ ambitions required an organizational form that could not only withstand the changing 
institutional context around them but also survive beyond their lives. The organizations as 
symbiotic entities combined power and resources, which in turn sustained the independence of 
the commercial business in a consolidating field and created sustainable philanthropy. 
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The Scotch whisky industry provides an opportunity to deconstruct the strategies and 
transitions that tipped the logic, structure, and boundaries of dominant institutions at that 
time.105 The sisters’ strategic foresight—realized in their creation of a new form of intersectoral 
organization (symbiotic vehicles of wealth creation and philanthropy) within the industry—
reshaped the norms, values, and future path of wealth-creating and philanthropic vehicles. Both 
entities were imprinted by the past life, experiences, and family values of the sisters (and their 
ancestors) and captured their response to shifting contexts and boundaries across distinct levels: 
individual, organizational, political, economic, and social.106 The sisters’ response to 
uncertainty within the field of whisky producers of that era is best captured across multiple 
levels through DiMaggio and Powell’s construct of mimetic isomorphism, which argues for 
the adaptation and transformation of an organization in response to uncertainty.107 Here, the 
sisters addressed uncertainty surrounding the future independence of the family business not 
by selling out, as per their peers, but by imitating the family trust ownership structures present 
in their industry and worldwide. The philanthropic focus and creation of a commercial vehicle, 
however, remains a model of structure and ownership distinctly different from other 
organizations within the immediate field. The sisters were able to translate their motivations 
into practice by manifesting familial traditions and norms into a new organizational structure, 
aided by their embeddedness in elite networks of advisors and the financial position they 
occupied.108 
This also echoes Anheier, who argues that organizational efficiency and survival are 
interwoven with its capacity to adapt to complexity in its environment.109 Philanthropy 
provided a pathway to protect and sustain the business, at a time of market consolidation, that  
did not rely upon selling out, a management buyout, or leaving succession to distant family 
members (as prevalent in most family businesses), as occurred elsewhere in the Scotch whisky 
industry. Rather, it set out an alternative and unfamiliar route within the organizational field to 
sustain the core activities and values of the family business and to generate wealth of a 
perpetual philanthropic form. This suggests that organizations need not necessarily be prisoners 





By viewing context across micro, meso, and macro factors, and being cognizant of 
personal and organizational motivations, we can identify little narratives across the varying 
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contextual levels that support our historical and theoretical contributions through extending 
understanding of organizational change and entrepreneurial philanthropy theory.112 The 
Robertson Trust and Edrington are distinct in the Scotch whisky industry by virtue of their 
relationship, having secured the original family ambitions of retaining independence and 
protecting their staff, even when the family line ended. However, they are not unique in general 
terms; a number of other philanthropic hybrid organizational forms exist.113 The symbiotic and 
enduring relationship in this story illustrates the value of history in extending our understanding 
of connections between philanthropy, business, and the state. It also provides insights into the 
importance of context in understanding motivations behind philanthropy and their impact on 
organizational form, which remain largely unexplored. 
The nomothetic value arising from the microhistory of the case analysis aligned to the 
wider context is illustrated by the explicit recognition “that change is multifaceted involving 
political, cultural, incremental, environmental, and structural, as well as rational 
dimensions.”115 In using history to identify the “little narratives” within the institutional story 
and across the different levels of context, we have enhanced understanding of drivers of 
organizational change and conceptualizations of entrepreneurial philanthropy by placing 
“history in theory” in the presentation of our model.117 Our multilevel historical analysis shows 
the interplay of the sisters’ motivations in moving toward philanthropy, stimulated by multiple 
levels of contextual shifts that aligned to their engagement with elite professional networks and 
their own generativity. This helped them to create perpetual symbiotic commercial and 
philanthropic enterprises. More importantly, it illustrates how business history helps to explain 
individual, organizational, and industry change at multiple levels, presenting an enhanced 
understanding of entrepreneurial philanthropy. 
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Figure 1: Context and capital theoretic model of entrepreneurial philanthropy. (Sources: ) 
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